Subjective probabilities are now collected on a number of large household surveys with the objective of providing data to better understand inter-temporal decision making.
It would seem obvious that any intertemporal decision would require the decisionmaker to have some beliefs about the probabilities of future events that are pertinent to the decision, and that this statement would be true even when decision-making is suboptimal. In some situations these beliefs could be consistent with the actual probabilities of those events, but in other situations they need not be. I will call the beliefs the decision-maker uses in making intertemporal decisions his or her subjective probability distributions about those future events.
For many years the main model of intertemporal economic decision-making by individuals (or households) has been based on the maximization of expected utility. In this setup an individual makes a choice at time t , but the consequences of that choice will not be known immediately, and those consequences will depend on stochastic events that are not under the control of the individual. For example, in choosing how much to spend an individual should take into account that his or her health may deteriorate, in which case more resources will be required for health care spending. In that health change has a large stochastic component, the decision-maker must choose spending only knowing the probability of a health decline, not whether it actually will decline. To maximize expected utility the decision-maker will consider utility in each of the possible future health states, and choose current spending (and hence carry-forward wealth) that will maximize the weighted average of utility in the various health states, where the weights are estimates of the probabilities of the different health outcomes.
In this setup, the intertemporal choice will depend on preferences, the constraints in the environment such as economic resources, and the subjective probability distributions of pertinent events. The objective of a theoretical or empirical investigation into intertemporal choice aims to estimate preferences, and typically the constraints can be observed. However such an investigation requires information about the probability distribution that the decision-maker used in coming to his or her choices because choice outcomes can be explained either by preferences or by subjective probability distributions (Manski, 2004) . For example, under uncertainty about future health, the choice to consume initially at a low level could be due to high risk aversion or to a subjective probability distribution on health outcomes that puts considerable probability on a transition to bad health.
The standard practice has been to assume that decision-makers have rational expectations; that is, their subjective probability distributions coincide with the true probability distributions. For example, in the case of returns in the stock market, the subjective probability distribution of returns held by individuals is the same as the actual probability distribution. For empirical study of decision-making there remains the problem of finding out what that true distribution is. In some situations, such as the stock market, historical data can be used to estimate the distribution of returns and the stability of the distribution of returns. If the stock market is roughly a random walk with drift, it may be reasonable to assume the true probability distribution of future returns can be estimated from historical data, and, indeed specialists have done that. In the study of portfolios, application of the rational expectations hypotheses means that individuals will use that same estimated historical distribution.
1 This type of reasoning and empirical 1 It is not explained how ordinary individuals will somehow come to the same conclusion about future stock market returns.
work have led to the so-called equity holding puzzle and its close cousin the equity premium puzzle: based on historical rates of return (both mean and variance) low rates of stock market participation can only be explained by very high levels of risk aversion (Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995) . However, many would say that these levels are unreasonable and that it is indeed a puzzle (Kocherlakota, 1996) .
The reasonableness of the assumption of rational expectations depends on the situation. An argument, which may well apply to a number of business situations, is that individuals or firms that do not have rational expectations will be driven out of business, so that the remaining players will have rational expectations. This argument, however, is example, a 61 year-old worker may be quite confident that she will retire at 62, and, while health may intervene to force an earlier retirement, the probability of such an event is rather low. In these examples, even if each individual has rational expectations, using population probabilities rather than individual probabilities to explain individual choice amounts to model misspecification.
Recognizing the importance of having measures of subjective probabilities on household surveys, some designers of household surveys began in the early 1990s to include questions about subjective probabilities. For example, in 1993 the Survey of Economic Expectations fielded subjective probabilities about future economic status (Dominitz, 1998; Manski, 1997a, 1997b) , and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) put a large number of them into its baseline wave in 1992. 2 The HRS has been most influential because of its large sample size, its extensive number of subjective probabilities and because it is a long-running panel survey. Therefore, a focus of this 2 See also Guiso, Jappelli & Terlizzese (1996) for an application of subjective probabilities based on the paper will be the empirical properties of some of the subjective probabilities measured in the HRS. Because of the new cohorts the sample size of the HRS is about 20,000.
In the 1992 baseline wave subjective probability distributions were elicited about these domains: survival, retirement, inflation, health care expenditures, unemployment, giving financial help, housing prices, Social Security benefits, economic depression and health limitations. This was an important development because of the large sample size of the HRS (about 12,000 in the initial wave), the large number of domains of actual outcomes including labor market participation, health, economic status, family linkages and program participation, and because of the longitudinal nature of the HRS. These features attracted many users to the HRS, and many took an interest in subjective probabilities. The HRS is a biennial longitudinal survey, and the subjective probability measures were repeated in subsequent waves. 3 The long-running nature of the HRS has meant that we can now see a number of the individual outcomes for which subjective probabilities were reported in early waves, and we have a large number of transitions providing data with which to study how subjective probabilities are updated when there is new information.
The first uses of the HRS data on subjective probabilities were cross-section studies that aimed to establish validity. In particular what was data quality in terms of the rate of item non-response and "outlier" type response; were average probabilities somewhat close to average actual outcomes; and did the probabilities vary across individuals in the same manner as the actual variation in outcomes? A main focus of research has been on subjective survival probabilities. The 1992 HRS asked about subjective survival to age 75. The rate of item nonresponse was just 2%, which is considerable lower than the rates for economic variables such as the components of income or wealth (Hurd & McGarry, 1995) . Average subjective survival probabilities were compared with life tables based on the following reasoning: Suppose that each individual knew and accurately reported his or her true probability of survival to 75
(which would vary from person to person). Because the expected value of actual survival equals the probability of survival, the average of the subjective probabilities will be close to the average actual survival rate of those individuals, and in large samples the two will be the same. In 1992 HRS the average subjective survival probability was 0.65 and the life table survival rate (1990 period life table) was 0.68 (Hurd & McGarry, 1995) . To the extent that the 1990 period life table accurately predicts actual survival, at the population level the subjective survival probabilities will accurately predict average population survival. This does not mean that individuals will necessarily have rational expectations:
for example average subjective survival probabilities in subpopulations could differ from survival outcomes in those subpopulations even though the population predicts accurately its survival. But had the average survival probabilities been wildly off, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used by individuals in their decision-making.
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In the initial wave of HRS average subjective survival probabilities varied across subpopulations in the same qualitative manner as actual survival. For example smokers reported lower survival probabilities than nonsmokers, and those with worse self-rated health reported lower survival probabilities. Thus it was established even in cross-section that the subjective survival probabilities would have predictive power for actual mortality outcomes, although not whether they would have predictive power conditional on observables such as smoking and self-rated health.
With the second wave of HRS in 1994 two important facts were established:
individuals who reported elevated subjective survival probabilities in 1992 tended to have lower actual mortality between 1992 and 1994; individuals who had new health events known to increase mortality risk such as a heart attack or the onset of cancer tended to reduce their subjective survival probabilities (Hurd & McGarry, 2002) .
The initial favorable experience with subjective probabilities in the HRS Because of the large body of empirical results based on the HRS I will mainly illustrate the current state of research on subjective probabilities with result from the HRS. The format in the HRS for querying about subjective probabilities begins with an introduction about weather which is a topic often discussed probabilistically:
Next we would like to ask your opinion about how likely you think various events might be. When I ask a question I'd like for you to
give me a number from 0 to 100, where "0" means that you think there is absolutely no chance, and "100" means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen.
For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrow's weather, but if you think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a 10 percent chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will rain tomorrow, you might say that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.
Then the specific subjective probability is asked as follows:
What is the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?
In a face-to-face survey respondents may be given a physical representation of the scale, but because many surveys are by telephone most of the data are collected without the respondent using a visual scale.
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Although the original purpose of obtaining subjective probabilities in surveys about economic behavior was to help model and estimate intertemporal decision-making, subjective probabilities have been used for a number of other purposes. An important investigation has been whether they predict outcomes. If they do, they would be valuable because they provide a quantitative prediction that is hard to obtain by other methods.
Furthermore, respondents are allowed to express uncertainty about their predictions of outcomes which can be use to establish confidence intervals about the predicted outcomes. The evaluation of the uncertainty about outcomes is important and cannot adequately be done using qualitative designations such as whether the outcome is "highly likely, likely, not likely" and so forth (Manski, 2004) . In discussing the relationship between subjective probabilities and actual outcomes I will concentrate on the probabilities of survival, the probability of working at some future age, and the probability of stock market gains. These are useful benchmarks because they are important in models of economic behavior, they have been studied fairly extensively, and in the HRS panel we can observe in some cases the actual outcomes that correspond to the subjective probabilities.
Subjective Survival
In 1992, the HRS asked about survival until age 75. Age-eligible respondents were about 51-61, so that the event had a 20-year horizon on average. Table 1 But we have observed 14-year mortality so that we can examine the relationship between subjective survival probabilities and mortality over a long time period. Table 2 shows relative 14-year survival rates and relative subjective survival rates to age 75. For example, the 14-year survival rate of men was about 90% of the 14-year survival rate of women; yet, the ratio of average P75 of men to average P75 of women was 0.94. Thus men were optimistic relative to women. As reference to Table 1 suggests both men and women may turn out to be pessimistic but women more pessimistic.
The relative survival rates by education, wealth and income show well-known gradients: the less educated and poorer die sooner than the better educated and wealthier.
For example, those lacking a high school education survived at a rate that was just 85%
of the survival rate of those with a college education. The ratios of subjective survival probabilities exhibit the same pattern, and even the magnitudes are quite close. An implication is that even in the absence of mortality data, one could establish hypotheses about mortality risk factors from a study of subjective survival probabilities.
Survival as a function of smoking and drinking exhibits the expected pattern, which is mirrored in the ratios of P75. Quantitatively, however, smokers apparently are optimistic about their survival chances relative to observed mortality outcomes, as are heavy drinkers. little discriminatory power at 6 or over. It remains to be seen whether future morality will reveal some discriminatory power at the upper end of P75. The other anomaly is the small but noticeable increase in mortality among respondents who reported P75 to be 10.
This uptick is likely due to an interaction between question format, cognitive ability and underlying health. The question mentions a range of 0 to 10, with the "10" coming last.
Most of HRS is administered by telephone, which increases a "recency effect," the likelihood of respondents replying with the most recently mentioned acceptable response, which in this case is "10." Those with low cognitive abilities are more likely to be influence by recency, and those with low cognition are more likely to be in worse health.
Of course, only a fraction of those reporting "10" are such recency repliers: many are in excellent health. This illustrates the requirement that to understand and use subjective survival probabilities we need to account for heterogeneity in response behavior, a topic that I will return to later in this review.
4. Subjective probability of working past age 62
In 1992 HRS asked all workers the following question abut work expectations:
Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what do you think are the chances that you will be working full-time after you reach age 62?
There was a follow-up question with target age 65. 10 I will call this the subjective probability of working past 62 (P62). Working past 62 is an example of a controlled stochastic process, where the degree of control varies considerable across individuals and where there is considerable private information.
Because the time horizon for working past age 62 is much shorter than for surviving to age 75, we can compare actual outcomes with predicted outcomes which are based on the subjective probabilities. An example of the method is to find workers in some particular age band, say 54-56, who reported a value for P62, and who reached age 62 or 63 by 2006 or earlier.
11 By using all waves we can achieve substantial sample size.
The comparison shows that the rate of actual full-time work at 62 or 63 is lower than the average of P62. For example, among workers age 52 or 53 the actual rate of full-time work when they were 62 or 63 was 32% yet the average P62 was 46%.
Although the difference decreases with age, it remains substantial even among those close to age 62: among workers age 60-61 the discrepancy is seven percentage points. I
do not want to make too much of these differences because of some ambiguity in the question about the precise target age, but they illustrate a general tendency, which I will discuss later, that when compared with actual outcomes, subjective probabilities tend to be biased toward 50%. Figure 2 shows the predictive power of P62 for actual work according to the age at which P62 was assessed. Consider, for example, workers age 50-51, the bottom line in the graph. Among those who reported P62 of zero, the rate of full-time work at age 62 was 17%; among those who reported P62 of 100% the rate of full-time work was 52%.
A notable feature, which verifies the discussion of the preceding paragraph, is that the rate of actual work is always less than the predicted average. A second notable feature is that the slope is considerably less than 1.0 which suggests measurement error on P62.
The other lines in Figure 2 show the rates of work among workers age 58-59 and age 60-61 at assessment of P62. As the age of assessment nears 62 the slopes of the lines 11 There some ambiguity in the question: does it refer to work status on the 62nd birthday, anytime after the 62nd birthday, or at the end of the 62nd year. I will present data showing work status as of the first HRS interview when the respondent is 62 or 63. As reference to Hurd, Reti & Rohwedder (forthcoming) shows the results are not materially different when a more strict control for age is imposed.
increase, showing greater explanatory power of P62 as workers near the target age. This increased explanatory power is, of course, to be expected because at ages just short of the target age a good deal of the uncertainty present at younger ages has been resolved.
While the aim of the question about P62 was to inform research into retirement and saving behavior, it has received a particularly interesting application about the trend in labor force participation. Beginning in the late 1980s the retirement age of men, which had been declining through the late 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, began to increase.
This can be seen directly in CPS data on labor force participation: among men 60-64 the rate increased from 55.5% in 1990 to 58.6% in 2006 and among men 65-69 the rate increased from 26.0% to 34.4%, even as the participation rate of younger men decreased.
There are a number of explanations for the increase, but what is interesting for this paper is that the cohorts predicted at least some of the increased work effort when they reported Using data on P62 to study retirement behavior rather than data on actual retirement has the advantage of making it easier to control for fixed effects. In models of retirement, as in many models of individual behavior, it is desirable to account for unobserved personal characteristics. When the model is linear with a continuous lefthand variable, first differences or fixed effects based on panel data are standard estimation methods, and they have the desirable features of imposing few restrictions and of being quite transparent. Retirement is mainly a binary event: most individuals retire once and remain retired so that in panel data the retirement outcomes are a string of "not retired" followed by a string of "retired." An appropriate statistical model is a model for binary outcomes with fixed effects such as Chamberlain (1982) and Manski (1987) .
These models impose distributional assumptions on the unobserved error. Further, the estimation only uses transition waves: in the case of retirement, the wave preceding retirement and the wave just after retirement. In a long panel the reduction in data is substantial: to just two waves among those observed to retire and to no data among those not observed to retire. However, in estimation based on P62, the binary retirement variable is replaced by a (almost) continuous variable allowing for a simple and transparent first-difference estimator where the fixed effect is differenced out. 12 All waves are used whether or not an individual retires.
A good example is the effect of health on retirement. Because health may be correlated with additional unobserved causal factors, estimations that do not account for fixed effects may be misleading. But, if health influences the probability of retiring, P62
should respond to changes in health, and, indeed, that is what is found in HRS data (McGarry, 2004) . Any unchanging personal characteristics are held constant in this comparison which is, in essence, a fixed effect estimator.
Although economic theory predicts that wealth will lead to early retirement, research on retirement typically finds very small wealth effects (Gustman & Steinmeier, 1986; Samwick, 1998) . This may be due to the difficulty of modeling and estimating the response of wealth accumulation to planned retirement: those who are especially concerned about a financially secure retirement will retire later and accumulate more wealth than those who are less concerned. However, an unexpected change in wealth should induce earlier-than-planned retirement, which can be detected by changes in P62 in panel data. Thus Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder (forthcoming) studied the effect of the boom in the stock market in the late 1990s and the bust in the stock market in the early 2000s on retirement by the change in P62 and by the relationship between actual retirement and P62. They found that the boom had no noticeable effect on retirement whereas the bust reduced the rate of retirement. Their statistical method was essentially linear fixed-effect estimation.
Subjective probability of a Stock Market gain
Although leading models of saving behavior predict that (almost) everyone will own stocks, the rate of stock ownership is far from complete: according to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances some 49% of families held stocks directly or indirectly, with a large fraction holding them through tax-advantaged accounts such as a 401k (Bucks et al., 2006) . The explanation for such low rates of stock holding has been high risk aversion because it was assumed that individuals had the same beliefs about stock returns as researchers who based their estimates on historical returns. However, there are at least two stages necessary to understand the relative lack of stock holding. The first is to understand the expectations individuals have about rates of return, and the second is to understand their purchasing conditional on their expectations. Only recently has research begun to gather data on their expectations via subjective probabilities.
From the point of view of understanding expectation formation, the stock market is particularly interesting because it is an uncontrolled stochastic process and because there is no private information. Therefore, differences in opinion must arise from differences in how individuals access and process information.
In 2002 the HRS added a question about stock market expectations in the form of a subjective probability as follows:
By next year at this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than they are today?
Unless the respondent stated zero percent chance he or she was asked the follow-up
By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have grown by 10 percent or more?
These responses give two points on the subjective probability distribution of stock market outcomes. Under the assumption that each individual has a two-parameter distribution of one-year stock market gains such as a normal distribution, the two observations can be used to estimated the probability distribution of gains for each individual, and, in particular, the mean and variance of each distribution (Dominitz & Manski, 2007) .
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According to the HRS data, individuals have substantially lower expectations of stock market gains than historical averages. In 2002 data, the average subjective probability of a stock market gain was just 49% whereas the historical probability was 73% (Kezdi & Willis, 2008) . The average probability of a 10% gain was 30% compared to a historical probability of 47%. In the 2004 data the average subjective probability of a gain was just 52%. The average was 46.4% (Dominitz & Manski, 2005) . Thus pessimistic subjective probabilities about the stock market are not confined to the older population.
These very low probabilities of a stock gain are also found in data from the DNB Household Survey, an ongoing panel survey of Dutch households which is run by 13 See Dominitz & Manski (1997) for an application to expected earnings.
14 The follow-up question about a gain of 10% or more was not asked in 2004.
CentERdata at the University of Tilburg. In April, 2004 respondents were asked about their subjective probabilities of stock market gains with reference to mutual fund invested in "blue chip" stocks like those in the Amsterdam AEX stock market index or similar indices. Respondent were asked about the probability of any gain, of a gain of 10% or more, 20% or more, and 30% or more, and the probability of a loss, of a loss of 10% or more, 20% or more, and 30% or more (Hurd, van Rooij & Winter, 2008) . An obvious conclusion from the HRS, the Michigan survey and the DNB data is that on average households hold much more pessimistic expectations about stock market gains than the historical averages. Indeed in the DNB data the median person would view a savings account as dominating the stock market in that the stock market has a lower rate of return and a higher variance. In these data there is no equity holding puzzle and no evidence for high risk aversion, which is an inescapable implication of assuming rational expectations.
There is considerable heterogeneity in expectations about stock market gains, some of which is observation error, but some of which is systematic. For example, in the HRS, males, those with more education, those with higher cognitive scores and those with more wealth expect higher stock market returns (Kezdi & Willis, 2008) . Based on Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence, Dominitz & Manski (2005) also found more optimistic chances for a gain among males, the young and the more educated.
Beliefs about stock gains predict whether someone holds stocks. In the HRS 2004 data those who have higher expectations of a stock market gain are more likely to own stocks, and the rate of stock ownership increases fairly steadily in the probability of a gain (Dominitz & Manski, 2007) . For example, among married males who reported the probability of a gain to be very low (1% to 10%), the rate of ownership was 27%; among those who reported the probability to be very high (90% to 99%) the rate was 43%. In the HRS 2002 data the average probability of a gain was 57% among those who hold stocks directly compared with just 41% among those who do not hold stocks (Kezdi & Willis, 2008) . It seems likely that ownership was induced by expectations of stock market gains, but it certainly is possible that ownership induced curiosity about gains leading to higher expectations.
These results suggest that to understand stock holdings we should study the determinants of stock market expectations. A striking finding across several data sets is that expectations are substantially influenced by recent changes in stock prices. In 2004
HRS the average probability of a gain was 52%, three percentage points greater than the life table the probability that a 51 year-old man will survival to age 75 is about 0.61, so that the objective probability of someone in poor health could well be 0.50 or less.
However, the spike in probability should not be greater at 50 than, say, at 60. The excess may due to so-called epistemic uncertainty, which is the lack of a well-formed probability distribution, or simply the tendency to choose toward the middle of a scale when the concept being queried is not understood (Fischhoff & Bruine de Bruin, 1999; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000) . Whatever the cause, the frequency of 50 percent reports is substantial across many domains.
In 2006 HRS introduced some experimental questions designed to investigate the causes of the high prevelence of 50s. 15 Respondents who answered 50% to the question about subjective survival were randomly assigned into a control group or into one of two experimental groups:
1. Do you think that it is about equally likely that you will die before 75 as it is that you will live to 75 or beyond, or are you just unsure about the chances? or 2. Do you think that it is about equally likely that you will die before 75 as it is that you will live to 75 or beyond, or are you just unsure about the chances, or do you think no one can know these things?
Similar assignment and questions were made and asked of those who gave a 50% response to the question about a one-year gain in the stock market. On analysis, the designers of the questions saw a flaw in question 2, so I will just report about the responses by those assigned to question 1.
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The rate of item nonresponse to the subjective survival question, P75, was just 4%. Among the responders, 23% reported a probability of 50%, and among those assigned question 1, just 37% said the chances of survival to age 75 were equally likely as the chances of dying before 75. Said differently, as classified by the responses to question 1, almost two-thirds of the 50% responses were uncertain about the true probability. Reference to Figure 6 shows that if the frequency of responses at 50% were reduced by two-thirds there would still be a focal point, but it would no longer be the largest focal point and could plausibly be due to rounding.
Item nonresponse to the question about a gain in the stock market was 24%, which already indicates that many people have little knowledge of the stock market.
Among responders, about 30% gave a response of 50%, and among those answering question 1, 34% said a gain was about as equally likely as a loss. Thus 39% of the population indicated quite directly that it did not know a probability of a one-year gain in the stock market.
16 "…no one can know these things" in Question 2 could refer to the actual mortality outcome or to the probability.
However, knowledge of the stock market is heterogeneous. Table 3 classifies individuals according to stock ownership and to whether they follow the stock market.
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Stock owners are much more likely to report a subjective probability of stock market gain, 11% "don't know or refuse" (DK/RF) versus 29% among non-owners. About 62%
of responses by owners were in the range 0-49% or 51-100% (and so did not responded with DK/RF or with 50%) compared with 50% among non-owners.
While stock ownership does predict knowledge of the stock market, whether someone follows the stock market is a much more powerful predictor of knowledge:
18 among those who follow the stock market closely (10% of the sample), the rate of DK/RF is just 6%. The high rate item nonresponse is concentrated in the part of the population that does not follow the stock market at all: it is 36% among that group. Table 4 shows the distribution of the responses to the question that aims to uncover epistemic uncertainty. Compared with non-owners, stock owners more frequently say that a 50% response does, indeed, mean that the chances are equally likely that stocks will go up as will go down, but the difference is not large. As with item nonresponse, whether some follows the stock market is a much better predictor of epistemic uncertainty. About half of those who follow the stock market closely say that a 50% response means equally likely compared with just 27% among those who do not follow the stock market. Combining the item nonresponse data with the epistemic uncertainty data of Table 4 shows that some 82% of respondents who follow the stock market closely report usable probabilities of a stock market gain compared with just 49%
among those who do not follow the stock market.
7. Bias in subjective probabilities
Compared with a cohort life table subjective survival has a negative bias (Table   1 ); compared with working past age 62, P62 has a positive bias; and compared with historical chances of a gain, stock market expectations have a negative bias. These examples suggest that when the true probability of an event is greater than 0.50, as is the case with P75 and with the stock market, the subjective probability will be understated (negative bias) and that when the true probability is less than 0.50, as is the case with P62, the subjective probability will be overstated. This is shown clearly in Figure 7 which has life This pattern of bias is to be expected from the excessive number of focal point answers at 50, but analysis shows that the bias cannot be completely be explained by the 50s. An additional explanation concerns the tendency of respondents to insufficiently adjust their answers away from 50% which is a natural starting point for assessing probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) .
Using subjective probabilities to explain behavior
Although the initial motivation for asking about subjective probabilities was to provide individual-level data about expectations that could be used in models of decisionmaking, by far most of their use has been in the types of applications which I have described above. There is a good reason for this emphasis: subjective probabilities are new measures and before they can be used in complex structural models their properties should be established. Furthermore, simple comparisons with outcomes that are not model dependent will best establish their credibility. However, there have some studies where subjective probabilities have been use to explain and understand choice. I will not review their findings in any detail because their come from a broad range of topics and will be of more interest to the specialist, nor will I attempt to list all of them. Rather I
want to illustrate what can be done. Finkelstein & McGarry (2006) studied whether the subjective probability of nursing home entry had explanatory power for actual entry and found that it did; but more importantly they found that the subjective probability influenced the holding of long-term care insurance. The approach allowed them to untangle risk aversion from adverse selection. Hurd, Smith & Zissimopoulos (2004) for. A causal interpretation of the results suggest that heterogeneity in expectations leads to heterogeneity in stockholding, and low average expectations, high uncertainty, and large heterogeneity in expectations explain much of the stockholder puzzle" (p.23).
Conclusions
The Introduction states that to understand intertemporal decision-making we need some measure of the probabilities that individuals use when making their decisions. The measure must be properly scaled if it is to be used in models and must be comparable across individuals. These requirements rule out verbal descriptions such as "likely" or "unlikely," which are not scaled and which have different meanings to different individuals. In situations where the true probability varies across individuals and where individuals have information about their personal probability, we should expect the measure to have predictive power for the actual outcome. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the measure will gain acceptance in the research or policy communities. This does not mean that the measure will have greater predictive power than any other predictor. A good example is survival where self-rated health is a more powerful predictor of survival than the subjective probability of survival: some individuals have little understanding of probabilities or their probabilities are not well formed whereas everyone has some understanding of their own health. The requirement that the measure has predictive power does not mean that it will be unbiased: individuals may be persistently misinformed about probabilities and base their decisions on incorrect probabilities. But we will not understand their decision-making unless we use those incorrect probabilities when studying their decisions.
The great majority of the research about subjective probabilities in economics has been concerned with their empirical properties: their predictive power, bias, scaling, focal point responses and so forth. Beyond increasing our understanding of the properties of subjective probabilities, some of this research has made important substantive findings about subjective beliefs in the population which explain behavior. The work on the subjective probabilities of stock market gain is an excellent example where direct measurement of the subjective probability of a gain resolves the stock-holding puzzle.
Despite the successes resulting from the measurement of subjective probabilities, in my view we still do not know whether the measures we use accurately correspond with the subjective probabilities that individuals use when making decisions. Partly this is a technical issue involved with survey methods. Recent experiments with focal point answers and rounding should lead to progress in the techniques used in surveys. But it also results from our not knowing how people make decisions conditional on their subjective probabilities. Of course, we have a theory that guides our thinking, but that theory may not be a good approximation at least for some individuals. It is also undoubtedly true that there is considerable heterogeneity in the population in the ability to form and report subjective probabilities. This is amply demonstrated in the recent experiments to explain the focal point responses of 50% about stock market gain.
Research should continue on the properties of the subjective probabilities. For example, the frequency of focal point answers varies from domain to domain suggesting that different mechanisms may be in operation or that the importance of the different mechanisms varies across domains. We need much more research on substantive economic issues that make use of subjective probabilities to explain behavior. And we need more research on the determinants of subjective probabilities. An obvious question about stock market expectations is why so many people are uninformed about the stock market when having better information would likely lead to better decisions and to better financial outcomes.
To use subjective probabilities effectively in models we need indicators of the quality of the reported probability by each individual: lacking such indicators, estimations may show only a weak relationship between subjective probabilities and behavior when, for a relevant part of the population, there is a strong relationship. Do you think that it is about equally likely that these mutual fund shares will increase in worth as it is that they will decrease in worth Table 1 of Dominitz and Manski, 2005 Actual and fitted subjective probability of stock gain 5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90  95  100 Subjective Probability
% frequency
Source: Author's calculations based on HRS 
